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NOTES AND COMMENTS
EXCLUSIONARY RULE UNDER ATTACK

Analysis of three cases-Harris u. New York, United States u.
Calandra and Michigan u. Tucker-reueals a systematic attack by
the current Supreme Court on the exclusionary concept in
search and seizure and self-incrimination cases. The author
examines the Court's treatment of precedent cases and explores
the logical framework of the erosion of the excluSionary rule's
protections accorded persons accused of crime.
Those assessing the Nixon Presidency may conclude that one of its
most significant legacies is the effect of his. realignment of the Supreme
Court on the criminal justice system. Four vacancies occurring in his
first administration gave Mr. Nixon
opportunity to mold the Court
in his own image. 1 The new majority created by his appointments has,
in only three years, made substantial inroads into major criminal
decisions of the Warren Court. Further limitations on the protections
accorded those accused or suspected of ,crime could'lead to the undoing
of the Warren "revolution."
The immediate target of the present Court seems to be the abolition
of the exclusionary rule 2 and its corollary doctrine, "the fruit of the
poisonous tree.,,3 A series of cases decided since 1971 has undermined
the force of the rule. 4 Two decisions announced in the first half of

an

1. Four months after taking office (May 21, 1969) Richard Nixon nominated Warren E.

Burger to replace retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren. On May 15. 1969. Justice Abe Fortas
resigned. A year later (May 12, 1970), after Senate rejection of successive nominations of
Clement Haynsworth and G. Harold Carswell. the appointment of Justice Harry A.
Blackmun was approved. In September 1971, Justices Hugo L. Black and John Marshall
Harlan both retired. The following month Mr. Nixon nominated Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and
William H. Rehnquist to the Court. The Senate approved Justice Powell's apPointment
on December 6, 1971, and Justice Rehnquisfs four days later. The Court was then, Nixon
told a presa conference, "as balanced as I can make it." The Washington Post, Jan. 20,
1973, at CoS.
2. The principle, sometimes called the "suppression doctrine," is that evidence obtained by
means of illegal. government activity is not admissible against one whose constitutional
rights have been violated by that activity. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. The prohibition is of the use of evidence derived from evidence which has been illegally
seized. The phrase originated with Justice Frankfurter, Nardone v. United States. 30S
U.S. 33S, 341 (1939), but the principle dates from Justice Holmes' statement in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920): "The essence of a
provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at
all." 1d. at 392.
4. Scheneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 21S (1973); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972);
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S: 443 (1971) (dissenting opinion); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(dissenting opinion).
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1974, United States v. Calandra s and Michigan v. Tucker, 6 weaken still
further both the rule and the corollary.
Chief Justice Burger came to the Court with a record of opposition
to the exclusionary rule and support of the common law principle that
so long as evidence is competent, the courts will not inquire into the
means by which it was obtained. 7 At his earliest opportunity he made
known the course he hoped the Supreme Court, under his leadership,
would adopt with regard to suppression of illegally obtained evidence.
In a lengthy and detailed dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 8 Chief Justice Burger
wrote:
For more than 55 years this Court has enforced a rule under
which evidence of undoubted reliability and probative value has
been suppressed and excluded from criminal cases whenever it
was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.... The
rule has rested on a theory that suppression of evidence in these
circumstances was imperative to deter law enforcement authorities from using improper methods to obtain evidence .... If an
effective alternative remedy is available, concern for official
observance of the law does not require adherence to the exclusionary rule ....
Although I would hesitate to abandon it until some meaningful substitute is developed, the history of the Suppression
Doctrine demonstrates that it is both conceptually sterile and
practically ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective. 9
5. 414 u.s. 338 (1974).
6. _U.S._ 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974).
7. See, e.g., Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman? 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964). The
common-law rule, defined in 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961)
was approved by the Supreme Court in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Adams
quoting from 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 245a noted: "It may be mentioned in this place
that though papers and other subjects of evidence may have been illegally taken from the
possession of the party against whom they are offered or otherwise unlawfully obtained,
this is no valid objection to their admissibility if they are pertinent to the issue. The Court
will not take notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully, nor will it
form an issue to determine that question." 192 U.S. at 595.
8. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens held that a Fourth Amendment violation by federal agents
gives rise to a federal cause of action for damages. although there is no express statutory
authorization for such a remedy.
9. [d. at 413-15. In the remainder of the Bivens dissent the Chief Justice outlined a
legislative proposal for a "meaningful substitute" for exclusion. It included: (a) waiver of
sovereign immunity; (b) creation of a cause of action for damages sustained by any person
aggrieved by conduct of governmental agents in violation of the Fourth Amendment or
statutes regulating official conduct; (c) creation of a special tribunal to adjudicate all
claims under the statute; (d) a provision that this statutory remedy is in lieu of the
exclusion of evidence secured for use in criminal cases in violation of the Fourth
Amendment; and (e) a provision directing that no evidence, otherwise admissible, shall
be excluded from any criminal proceeding because of violation ofthe Fourth Amendment.
S. 881, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), introduced by Senator Lloyd Bensten (D. Tex.) in
February 1973, follows the Burger guidelines. Damages would not be assessed against the
offending agent, but directly against the United States, on the theory of respondeat
superior. The measure provides no remedy for violations by state officers, a problem the
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In the same dissent the Chief Justice also suggested the strategy he
felt the Court should follow in attacking the exclusionary rule, at least
in search and seizure cases:

I do not propose, however, that we abandon the suppression
doctrine until some meaningful alternative can be developed. In
a sense our legal system has become the captive of its own
creation. To overrule Weeks and Mapp, even assuming the Court
was now prepared to take that step, could raise yet new problems. Obviously the public interest would be poorly served if
law enforcement officials were suddenly to gain the impression,
however erroneous, that all constitutional restraints on police
had somehow been removed-that an open season on "criminals" had been declared. I am concerned lest some such mistaken impression might be fostered by a flat overruling of the
suppression doctrine cases. For years we have relied upon it as
the exclusive remedy for unlawful official conduct; in a sense
we are in a situation akin to the narcotics addict whose dependence on drugs precludes any drastic or immediate withdrawal
of the supposed prop, regardless of how futile its continued use
may be. 1 0
The present Court's decisions dealing with the exclusionary rule have
followed this policy of gradual withdrawal. They have limited, eroded
and contradicted earli~r suppression cases, especially Mapp v. Ohio1 1
and Miranda v. Arizona. 1 2 They have nullified important aspects of
these and other decisions protective of the rights of the accused.! 3 But

10.

11.
12.
13.

Chief Justice dismisses by saying, "Once the constitutional vali~ity of such a statute is
established, it can reasonably be assumed that the States would develop their own
remedial systems on the "federal model." 403 U.S. at 423-24. This, of course, also
assumes-not so reasonably-that the states would waive sovereign immunity to suit in
such cases. Any action under such a measure would naturally be subject to all tort
defenses, including good faith.
Id. at 420-21. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), announced the same
day as Bivens, the Chief Justice continued the theme: "This case illustrates graphically
the monstrous price we pay for the exclusionary rule in which we seem to have imprisoned
ourselves." 403 U.S. at 493. Coolidge, holding inadmissible evidence seized under a
warrant authorized by a prosecuting attorney rather than by a neutral magistrate, and
rejecting the same evidence under the "plain view" doctrine because its discovery was not
inadvertent, found three Justices, Burger, Blackmun and Black, in agreement that the
Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would not support an exclusionary rule. Justice
White also dissented from the Coolidge holding, but on the ground that the Fourth
Amendment was satisfied. Chief Justice Burger declined to accept the proposition,
advanced by Justice Black in both Coolidge and Mapp, that the Fifth Amendment
requires exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The present Court's treatment of the Warren Court decisions of Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illi!}ois, 378 U.S. 478 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); and Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), as well as the earlier cases of
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); and Counselman v.
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they have not openly and candidly overruled them, announcing new
law to take their place. This comment will assess the current status of
the exclusionary principle, and examine critically the methods the
present Court has employed to attack it.
THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Most of the twentieth century courts have excluded evidence resulting from illegal searches and seizures, l 4 coerced confessions, 1 5
and compulsory self-incrimination. 1 6 The Warren Court made the exclusionary rule binding on the states, 1 7 clarified the bases for its
application, and increased the number of contexts in which illegally
obtained evidence would be suppressed. Having held the privilege
against self-incrimination applicable to the states, 1 8 it applied that
privilege to the admissibility of confessions. 1 9 It then extended the

14.

15.

16.

17.
18.
19.

HitChcock, 142 u.S. 547 (1892) will be developed more fully in the text and subsequent
notes.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), enunciated the rule for search and seizure
cases. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applied it to the states, after Wolfv. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), had held that freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures was a
right protected against invasion by the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In
search and seizure cases exclusion is grounded on the Fourth Amendment. Justice Black
consistently maintained that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would not support
the principle, but that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, taken together, as in Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), and Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S: 616 (1886),
compelled exclusion. Thus when he found no Fifth Amendment violation Justice Black
refused to apply the exclusionary rule. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
(Black, J., dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Black, J., concurring).
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Early cases found authority for the exclusion of evidence, either physical or testimonial,
extracted from a defendant by brutal or shocking methods in the concept of due process.
Hence the rule in this context was applied to the states as early as 1936. See, e.g.,
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940).
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), held that a defendant could not be
compelled to give self-incriminating testimony unless he was granted immunity from
prosecution co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege, and that the government
was barred from both direct and derivative use of such testimony. See also Ullman v.
United States, 3..'\0 U.S. 422 (1956); Shapiro v. United States, 355 U.S. 1 (1948); Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Writing for the majority in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), Justice Brennan
re-examined the history of suppression of coerced confessions. Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908), had held that the Fifth Amendment privilege was not a "fundamental
right" and hence was not applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), Justice Brennan conceded, had
felt impelled in light of the Twining decision, to base exclusion on the common-law
confession rationale and to say that its holding did not involve self-incrimination. He
concluded: "But this distinction was soon abandoned, and today the admissibility of a
confession in a state criminal prosecution is tested by the same standard applied in
federal prosecutions since 1897, when, in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, the Court
held that '[i)n criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question
arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled
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Fifth Amendment's exclusionary rule to police interrogation of a suspect in custody 20 and to identification testimony derived from improperly conducted lineups.2 I It also defined important limitations to
the rule,22 chief among which was the requirement that standing to
invoke it is predicated on an invasion of one's own constitutional
rights-that one may not vicariously assert the rights of another.2 3
Growing out of the concept of exclusion was the doctrine of the
"fruit of the poisonous tree," which bars secondary exploitation of the
primary illegality.2 4 Not only is illegally obtained evidence subject to
exclusion, but other evidence derived from it is suppressed as well. The
Warren Court, although it narrowed the doctrine somewhat,25 extended its application to verbal as well as tangible material. 2 6
As the . law stood when the present Court was assembled, one who
was personally aggrieved was entitled, in a federal or a state court, to
suppression of physical evidence, a statement or confession, or identification testimony unlawfully obtained by state agents. The government was not permitted to profit from its illegal activity. Unless the
by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
commanding that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." , " 378 U.S. at 6-7. For discussion of confessions ane;! self-incrimination,
see L. LEvY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT-THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
(1968); Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935 (1966).
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda based exclusion on both the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination clause and the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
counsel, which the Court said was essential to make the Fifth Amendment guarantee
meaningful in the interrogation setting.
In Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) and McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943), which held inadmissible confessions obtained from a suspect held an
unduly long time without being arraigned before a magistrate, the exclusionary rule was
applied as a rule of evidence only, based on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court
over the lower federal courts. Since this power derived directly from FED. R. CRlM.
P. 5(a), the McNabb-Mallory rule does not apply to the states. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 598-602 (1961).
21. The companion decisions, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), grounded the exclusion of a witness' identification of a
suspect based on a lineup at which the accused was denied the assistance of counsel on
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, as well as due process.
22. These are in addition to the constitutional limitation that illegally obtained evidence will
be excluded only when significant state action was involved in its production.
23. The leading standing cases have concerned illegal searches and seizures. Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), rejected the "subtle distinctionll" of common-law property
concepts which courts had employed for many years to deny standing to those who had no
possessory interest in the premises invaded, holding that "anyone legitimately on
premises where a search occurs may challenge its legality.by way of a motion to suppress,
when its fruits are proposed to be used against him." [d. at 267. Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), held, however, that Fourth Amendment rights are personal
and may not be vicariously asserted. Alderman decided that one has no standing to suppress evidence unlawfully seized from another, but must establish that the illegal search
aggrieved him personally.
24. Note 3 supra.
25. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), granted the prosecution a limited right to use
otherwise inadmissible evidence to impeach a defendant's trial testimony on matters
collateral to his guilt or innocence.
26. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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prosecution could show that the evidence in question derived from an
independent, legal source,27 the courts were required to prohibit its
indirect use. 28 The rule applied to anything of evidentiary value, no
matter how trustworthy it might be. 2 9
From the time of the exclusionary rule's announcement in Weeks v.
United States 30 until the start of the present decade, the unmistakable
trend was toward its expansion and extension into new areas. The
present Court has begun a process of contraction and limitation. Four
important decisions before 1974 signaled a course toward more tolerant
standards of admissibility. Harris v. New York,31 which will be examined in detail, held that a defendant's statements made to police in the
absence of adequate Miranda warnings are admissible to impeach his
testimony at trial.
.
Kastigar v. United States, 3 2 which upheld a "use immunity" statute, 3 3 reduced the scope of immunity required to be ~Tanted one
compelled to give self-incriminating testimony.34 Kastigar held that,
since the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply unless the witness
is exposed to possible criminal penalties, 3 5 only the compelled testimony itself, or any evidence derived from it, will be excluded in a
subsequent criminal prosecution of the witness. The government is not
foreclosed, as courts for eighty years had held it was,36 from future
prosecution for the offense or "transaction" to which the testimony
relates.
In 1972, in Kirby v. Illinois,3 7 the Court limited the number of
situatiorts in which identification testimony would be suppressed.
United States v. Wade 38 and Gilbert v. California 39 had announced a
27. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
28. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). The ban on indirect use is not, however,
absolute. As the connection between the illegal activity and the evidence sought to be
introduced grows more tenuous, the taint becomes "dissipated," and the evidence may be
admitted. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
29. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
30. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
31. 404 U.S. 222 (1971).
32. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
33. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-03 (1970).
34. See also Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S 472 (1972);
Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971).
35. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 ... [The I sole concern [of the privilege I is ... with
the danger to a witness forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of 'penalties
affixed to the criminal acts ... .' Immunity displaces the danger. Once the reason for the
privilege ceases, the privilege ceases." [d. at 438-39, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
36. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892). "We are clearly of the opinion
that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers
the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege
conferred by the Co~stitution of the United States .... In view of the constitutional
provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which the question relates." See also Ullman v.
t:nited States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
37. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
38. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
39. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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rule of per se exclusion of identifications based on lineups at which
the suspect was denied the assistance of counsel. Kirby held that the
Wade-Gilbert rule does not apply to lineups held before the accused was
under indictment. This was an apparent, though tacit, reversal, since
cases denying retroactivity to the rule, as well as subsequent applications of it, had dealt with pre-indictment lineups.40 Although the
Kirby Court distinguished the underlying basis of Miranda, 41 its reasoning that the right to counsel does not attach before "the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment't4 2
appears to mark a turning away from that decision. 4 3
In 1973, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,44 the Court refused to
extend the requirement of Miranda-type warnings to the search and
seizure context. Evidence will not be excluded because of the state's
failure to prove that one who consented to a search knew, or was
notified, that he had the right to withhold his consent.4 5
With these decisions the Court arrested the expansion of the exclusionary rule. Within a six-month period, it dealt the doctrine two
further blows. United States v. Calandra, 4 6 decided in January 1974,
held that a grand jury witness who has been granted immunity from
prosecution has no standing to invoke the exclusionary rule to bar
questions based on evidence illegally seized from him. Michigan v.
Tucker,47 announced in June, decided that when a suspect is interrogated without being given full Miranda warnings, the testimony of a
witness whose identity was learned through that interrogation is admissible at trial, when the witness himself is available for cross-examination. 48
40. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See also
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
41. "[Tlhe Miranda decision was based exclusively upon the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self· incrimination. upon the theory that
custodial interrogation is inherently coercive." 406 U.S. at 688. Kirby, said the Court,
concerned only the right to counsel; the privilege against self· incrimination was "in no
way implicated." ld. at 687.
42. ld. at 689.
43. Writing for the majority in Kirby, Stewart, J., said: "The initiation of judicial criminal
proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of
adverRary criminal justice. For it is only then that the Government has committed itself
to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of Government and defendant have
solidified." 406 U.S. at 689. This is a decided departure from Miranda's statement that
"our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences" when "the individual is first
subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of
his freed9m of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. at 477. The "starting point"
language of Kirby also appears to restrict the principle of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964), which held that pre·indictment interrogation is a "critical stage" of criminal
proceedings, during which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.
44. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
45. This also appears to repudiate the philosophical basis of Miranda, that one cannot make
an intelligent waiver of a right unless he knows that the right exists, and that the only way
to be sure he knows is not to rely on presumption, but to tell him.
46. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
47. _U.S.-. 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974).
48. This is the question expressly left open in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968),
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In both of these cases the Court went beyond its narrow holdings to
issue broad pronouncements redefining the limitations and purposes of
the exclusionary rule. So inimical are these declarations to the doctrine
as twentieth-century courts have developed it that Justice Brennan, in
dissent from the opinion in Calandra, was moved to sound a note of
alarm:
In Mapp, the Court thought it had "close[d] the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness" in violation of Fourth Amendment rights. The
door is again ajar. As a consequence, I am left with the uneasy
feeling that today's decision may signal that a majority of my
colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the door still
further and abandon the exclusionary rule in search and seizure
caseS.49
An examination of the methods that this Court has employed to
diminish the exclusionary rule without the necessity of "any drastic or
immediate withdrawal of the supposed prop"s 0 -i.e., without overruling Weeks, Mapp and Miranda and the cases that rely on them-is
illuminating. Careful study of three cases, Calandra, Tucker and the
1971 decision Harris II. New YorkS 1 discloses a disconcerting reliance
on selective reasoning, manipulation and sometimes outright misstatement of controlling precedent. s 2

HARRIS V. NEW YORK
The Harris opinion gave the new Chief Justice an opportunity to try
the strategy he would later urge in Billens. S 3 He seriously weakened
Miranda, but did not withdraw its support altogether. Harris has been
thoroughly analyzed. s 4 It merits attention here, however, because it
provided a foundation for the decision in Tucker.

49.
50.
51.
52.

53.
54.

which held that since the defendant's testimony at his first trial was the fruit of an
illegally obtained confession, it could not be introduced at his retrial. The Court said:
"We have no occasion in this case to canvass the complex and varied problems that arise
when the trial testimony of a witness other than the accused is challenged as 'the eventiary product of the poisoned trp-e. '" 329 U.S. at 223 n.9.
414 U.S. at 365 (citation omitted).
Note 10 supra.
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
Dershowitz and Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and
Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1201-08 (1971), present a
convincing argument that the Harris opinion also involved misrepresentation of the
record.
Harris was decided sQme four months before Bivens and Coolidge.
Excellent examinations of its reasoning and implications are Dershowitz and Ely, Harris
v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198 (1971); Kent, Harris v. New York: The Death Knell of
Miranda and Walder?, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 357 (1971); Admitting the Inadmissible: The
Wounding of Miranda, 23 BAYLOR L. REv. 639 (1971); and Note, Harris v. New York-A
Retreat from Miranda, 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 118 (1971).

1974}

Exclusionary Rule Under Attack

97

Harris was arrested for selling heroin to an undercover police officer.
Before questioning him, the police told him of his right to be silent, of
possible evidentiary use of any statement he might make, and of his
right to consult an attorney. They did not tell him of his right to
court-appointed council. s 5 He eventually gave the police an incriminating statement, which the prosecution did not introduce in its case in
chief. Taking the stand at trial, Harris claimed that he had actually sold
baking powder, intending to defraud the purchaser.
On cross-examination Harris was confronted with the transcript of
his interrogation. Although the transcript was not shown to the jury,
the prosecutor read the questions and answers from it. Harris' answers
on cross-examination were wholly inconsistent with parts of his prior
statement. The trial court instructed the jury that it should consider the
statement only in relation to the defendant's credibility, and not as
evidence of his guilt. The jury convicted on one count of the two-count
indictment.
Harris testified on cross-examination that he did remember making a
statement, but he was vague in recalling what he had said. Queried on
his poor memory, he replied, "My joints was down and I needed
drugs ...S6 He admitted that he was a heroin addict.
The Court, in an eleven-paragraph opinion, ruled that the uncounseled statement was admissible to impeach the defendant's trial testimony, "provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence
satisfies legal standards." s 7
Leaving aside the question of the legal trustworthiness of the statement, made while under arrest, of an addict experienCing withdrawal,
the majority's treatment of the two cases on which it purports to rely
prompts some concern.
To deal with the self-incrimination question, the Court first had to
come to terms with Miranda. Six federal courts of appeal and appellate
courts of fourteen states had interpreted that decision as making no
55. The interrogation took place before Miranda was decided, but since the trial was after
Miranda, under the rule of Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), Miranda applied:
56. 401 U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. 1d. at 224. Chief Justice Burger by implication resurrects the trustworthiness rationale
of the coerced confession rule, see Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941), which
had been on the decline for years before being laid to rest in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S.
534, 540-41 (1961): "Our decisions under [the Fourteenth) Amendment have made clear
that convictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.e., the product of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is
not so because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to
extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of ot:r law: that ours is an
accusatorial and not inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish
guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its
charge against an accused out of his own mouth."
The Chief Justice has long supported the trustworthiness premise. Writing in dissent
in Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1959), which concerned a statement
obtained in violation of the Mallory rule, then Judge Burger wrote: "A coerced confession
is rejected because it is not a true statement but one exacted by duress or force and thus
inherently unreliable. A confession rejected under Rule 5(a) for 'unnecessary delay' is
not discredited as inherently untrustworthy; it is rejected as a means of enforcing Rule
5(a)-a prophylactic suppression." 1d. at 921, n.l.
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"distinction between statements used on direct as opposed to crossexamination."s8 Harris, however, evaded the Miranda barrier by branding as dictum, and therefore "not controlling," one of Miranda's important explicative passages. The Chief Justice wrote:
Some coknments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read
as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any
purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessw:y to
the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling.
Miranda barred the prosecution from making its case with
statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having
or effectively waiving counsel. It does not follow from Miranda
that evidence inadmissible against -an accused in the ptosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes .... 5 9
One passage in Miranda that "can indeed be read" to bar use for any
purpose of a statement obtained without giving all four of the required
warnings is the following:
·The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully
effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any
statement made by a defendant. No distinction can be drawn
between statements which are direct confessions and statements
which amount to "admissions" of part or all of an offense. The
privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from
being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner; it does
not distinguish degrees of incrimination. Similarly, for precisely
the same reason, no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely "exculpatory." If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it
would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact,
statements merely intented to be eXCUlpatory by the defendant
are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and
thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be
used without full warnings and effective waiver required for any
other statement. 6 0
58. 401 U.S. 222, 231 (dissenting opinion), and cases cited note 4 supra, including Franklin v.
State: 6 Md. App. 572, 252 A.2d 487 (1969).
.
59. 401 U.S. at 224.
60. 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966) (emphasis added). This is not the first time this Court has
branded an important passage in an earlier case as dictum and therefore "not controlling." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), stated that only absolute immunity
could supplant the Fifth Amendment privilege. Two later cases, Adams v. Maryland,
347 U.S. 179, 182 (1954) and United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931), had called
this the principle of Counselman. Nevertheless, the present Court, in Kastigar v. United
States. 406 U.S. 411, 455 (1972), said that this statement was in the context of anllillary
points, not necessary to the holding.

1974]

Exclusionary Rule Under Attack

99

This language, though not essential for reversal of the four convic·
tions under review in Miranda, unmistakably conveys the Court's think·
ing concerning the exact situation found in Harris and the precise use to
which the defendant's statement was put. 6 1
If the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause has been violated,
it is not the Court but the Constitution that demands exclusion. Yet in
discussing Miranda's requirement of suppression of testimony obtained
from a defendant without a knowing, intelligent waiver of the Fifth
Amendment privilege, Chief Justice Burger makes no mention of the
exclusionary rule contained in the Amendment itself. 62 Instead, he
predicates suppression on deterrence of police misconduct6 3 -a rationale that, when acknowledged, has largely been confined to se'arch and
. seizure cases,64 and has no place in a self-incrimination setting. The
following language in Harris, then, seems incongruous in its Fifth
Amendment context: "Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows
when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in
its case in chief.'t6 5
Even if this assertion were constitutionally sound, its reasoning avoids
reality. In practical application Harris holds out a strong inducement to
police to violate Miranda's command if they cannot get a statement by
complying with it. Suppose, for example, that a suspect is given the
Miranda warnings and starts to answer questions, then changes his mind
and asks that the interrogation be stopped. The officer will be greatly
tempted to continue, knowing that if he does compel. a confession, it
can be used to impeach any testimony the defendant offers-if the mere
fact of the prosecution's having it does not keep the defendant off the
stand in the first place. Since the state's case seldom depends entirely
on the defendant's statement, without corroborating testimony (as it
may on illegally seized physical evidence), losing the use of such a
statement in the case in chief may be a small price to pay for the
61. That this was the result intended by the Miranda Court is indicated by the fact that the
equation of admissions and "exculpatory" statements to confessions drew specific
criticism in each of the three dissenting opinions filed in Miranda. 384 U.S. 436, 502
(Clark, J., dissenting and concurring); [d. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting); [d. at 535
(White, J., dissenting).
62. "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
63. This is an old theme for the Chief Justice. Two years before Miranda was decided he
wrote: "We Bee thus that the Supreme Court has steered a waivering course-Justice
Jackson called it 'inconstant and inconsistent'-in explaining the suppression of evidence
obtained by official illegality. At times, confusing and even contradictory rationales have
been put forward. But despite this groping, the Court now appears to have settled upon
the need for deterrence of police violations as the principal reaEon for suppression."
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman? 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1964).
64. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled in part, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 365 U.S. 206 (1960); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128
(1954).
65. 4Ol"U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
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prosecutorial advantage to be gained by (1) possibly preventing the
defendant from testifying, and (2) acquiring a statement that may
provide further investigatory leads, including the identities of witnesses'
whose testimony now, under Tucker, will be admissible.
An additional passage in Harris indicates a lack of sympathy with the
central theme of Miranda:
Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing
devices of the adversary process. Had inconsistent statements
been made by the accused to some third person, it could hardly
be contended that the conflict could not be laid before the jury
by way of cross-examination and impeachment.6 6
The apparent error is that Harris did not make his statement to
"some third person," but to the police, in custodial interrogation-the
very situation that Miranda went to exhaustive lengths to demonstrate
as coercive.6 7 To fail to see a distinction between a casual remark to an
acquaintance and a statement given to interrogating officers in a police
station is to ignore Miranda's reasoning in extending the privilege
against self-incrimination to the interrogation setting.
Another case vitiated by the Harris Court was Walder v. United
States. 68 It was on this case that Harris relied as direct precedent for
permitting illegally produced evtdence to be used for impeachment. 69
Walder had once been indicted for purchasing and possessing heroin.
The prosecution was dropped, following his successful motion to suppress the evidence. Two years later he was again indicted, on other
narcotics charges. At trial he denied ever having bought, sold, possessed
or given away any narcotics in his entire life. On cross-examination he
reiterated these statements. The government then, over his objection,
questioned him about the heroin capsule unlawfully siezed from him
two years before. Denying that any narcotics had been taken from him,
Walder flatly contradicted the affidavit he had filed in connection with
his motion to suppress the evidence in the earlier proceeding. The
government then called one of the officers who had taken part in the
unlawful search and seizure and the chemist who had analyzed the
capsule it produced. The trial judge admitted this evidence, charging the
jury that it was not to be used to determine guilt or innocence, but
solely to test the defendant's credibility. The conviction was affirmed.
The difference between Walder's position and Harris' is apparent. If
66. Id. at 325-26.
67. Miranda dwells on the unique conditions existing in the police station, describing in
detail the psychological techniques used by police to extract confessions. 384 U.S. 436,
448-55 (1966).
68. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
69. 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971).
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the Walder jury chose to believe the government's rebutting evidence, it
was led inevitably only to conclude that the defendant was not truthful. It was not bound to convict him. The Harris jury could hardly do
otherwise, if it believed the impeaching testimony.
The Walder holding was expressly limited to rebuttal of collateral
issues raised by the defense:
Of course the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest
opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be
free to deny all elements of the case against him without
thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of
rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not
available for its case in chief. 7 0
This language, like that cited earlier from Miranda, seems clearly to
deal with the precise situation found in Harris. 7 1 Certainly the defendant was not "free to deny all elements of the case against him" when
the government could impeach his denial by means of his own illegally
obtained statement, directly incriminating him. Harris renders the limiting language of Walder inoperative:
It is true that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters
included in his direct examination, whereas petitioner here was
impeached as to testimony bearing more directly on the crimes
charged. We are not persuaded that there is a difference in
principle that warrants a result different from that reached by
the court in Walder .... The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing petitioner's credibility, and the benefits of this process should not
be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that
impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby. 72
Surely the impeachment process was helpful to the jury, but the
cost to the defendant was scarcely a "speculative possibility", since
our Constitution recognizes a "difference in principle" between refusing to allow one defendant to perjure himself on a collateral matter' 3
and permitting the government to prove its case against another by
flouting his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Harris Court advanced a
policy justification for its holding: "The shield provided by Miranda
70. 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
71. Walder stated a very narrow exception to an important principle of Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), that evidence produced by means of an illegal search and
seizure is not admissible in rebuttal when the defendant has not testified concerning it in
his direct examination. 269 U.S. at 35. By ignoring Walder's express limitation of the
application of its holding: the Harris Court appears to have overruled. without citing. this
aspect of Agnello.
72. 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
73. It was clear that Walder had, in fact, committed perjury, since both his earlier affidavit
and his contradictory testimony were made under oath. Such was not the case with
Harris.
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cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense,
free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances."74
This pronouncement necessarily assumes that the defendant's unsworn statement, made in the "inherently coercive"75 atmosphere of
station-house interrogation, when he had not seen an attorney, and was
badly in need of drugs, IS true, whereas the testimony given in court,
under oath, and with the assistance of counsel who himself had an
interest in preventing perjury in his client, is false. The basis for such an
assumption would seem to be that the defendant who says "I did it" is
always telling the truth, and the one who says "I didn't" is always
lying--which hardly comports with the presumption of inna.cence.
The Court's justification further assumes that, on balance, the government's interest in preventing perjury outweighs the individual's
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. To strike such
a balance gives little weight to a constitutional guarantee that has been
called the "essential mainstay" of the adversary system. 7 6 The government has a ready remedy for perjury, in prosecution for that offense
and imposition, following conviction, of the penalty affixed by law. It
is both unnecessary and constitutionally impermissible for a court to
assume perjury where none is proven and to punish it, without trial, by
compelling a defendant to incriminate himself on another, unrelated
charge. Harris was not asserting a right to perjure himself, 7 7 any more
than he was asserting a right to deal in narcotics. His claim was no more
than the Constitution guarantee of the right to a trial free of the taint
of self-incrimination.
UNITED STATES V. CALANDRA
In January, 1974, the Court carved another deep inroad into the
exclusionary rule, and appeared to repudiate its constitutional bases as
enunciated over the past sixty years since Weeks v. United States. 7II
United States v. Calandra, 79 in a 6-3 decision written by Justice Powell,
held that a witness granted immunity from' prosecution must answer a
grand jury's questions based on evidence obtained in violation of the
witness' own Fourth Amendment rights.
74 401 U.S. 222. 226 (1971). The terminology is borrowed from Walder: "[T)here is hardly
justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in
reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility:' 347 U.S. 62. 65
(1954).
75. This epithet. fIrSt used in Ashcraft v. Tennessee. 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
was accepted by the present Court in Kirby v. Illinois. 406 U.S. 682. 688 (1972).
76. Malloy v. Hogan, !l78 U.S. 1.7 (1964).
7":. The Court spoke of "right"· liS well as license: "Every criminal defendant is privileged to
testify in his own defense. or to refuse to do suo But that privilege cannot be construed to
include the right to commIt perjury:' 401 U.S. 222. 225.
78. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
79. 414 U.S !l.'lfI /19741
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In connection with
investigation of suspected illegal gambling,
federal agents secured a warrant authorizing a search of John Calandra's
place of business. The warrant specified that the object of the search
was bookmaking records and wagering paraphernalia. Executing it, the
agents conducted a thorough four-hour search of the two-story Royal
Machine and Tool Company, spending more than three hours going
through Calandra's office and flies.
Although the agents found no gambling equipment, one discovered a
card indicating that a certain doctor had been making periodic payments to Calandra. Aware that the U.S. Attorney's office had been
investigating extortionate credit transactions, and that the doctor had
been a victim of loan sharks, the agent seized the card.
Three months later a special federal grand jury was convened to
investigate possible loan-sharking activities. It subpoenaed Calandra to
question him about the evidence seized during the earlier search.
Calandra appeared, but refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment. The government then requested the district court to grant him
transactional immunity, pursuant to the statute then in effect.80
Calandra moved8 I for suppression and return of the evidence on the
grounds that the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and
that the search exceeded its scope. At a hearing on the motion, he
stipulated that he would refuse to answer questions based on the seized
materials. The district court granted the motion and ordered that
Calandra need not answer any of the grand jury's questions based on
the evidence, holding that:

... there is a requirement of due process which allows a
witness to litigate the question 9f whether the evidence which
constitutes the basis for the questions asked of him before the
grand jury has been obtained in a way which violates the
constitutional protection against unlawful search and seizure. 8 2
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the district
court had properly entertained the suppression motion and that a grand
jury witness may invoke the exclusionary rule to bar questioning based
on evidence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure, regardless of
any grant of immunity.8 3
Justice Powell reviewed at some length the history and purpose of
the grand jury, paying particular attention to its inquisitorial function.
The decision in this case, he said, would balance the historical importance of that function against the deterrence value of the exclUSionary
rule if the petitioner were permitted to invoke it in this context.8 4 The
Court of Appeals had said: U Against the interest of unencumbered
80. 18 U.S.r.. § 2514 \1968\.
81 "'ED. R .. r.RIM. P. 41(el.
,.
82. In re Calandra. ~2 F. Supp. 7:17. 742 I flo. I). Ohlll 19711.
q,'3. United StateR \. (,alandra. 465 fo' :!d 1211'1 it,th Cit. 1972',.
84. 414 U.S. :338. 347 (\9741.
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inquiry and the efficient administration of justice must be weighed the
importance which society attaches to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment guarantee of privacy which is afforded by access to the
exclusionary rule and Rule 41(e)."s 5
The Court refused to impede the grand jury's functioning by making
what it called an "unprecedented extension"s 6 of the exclusionary rule
to its proceedings. Such an extension, however, is not without precedent. Both the district court and the Court of Appeals concluded that,
although the law on the precise question was unsettled,s 7 the better
authority favored the extension of the rule. 8 8
Calandra, of course, was not interested in deterring future police
misconduct. He sought to mitigate the immediate effect on him of a
past invasion of his rights. Justice Powell could offer him no comfort:
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the
injury to the privacy of the search victim: "[T]he ruptured
privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored.
Reparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
637 (1965). Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future
unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee
of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and
seizures: "The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the
incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
217 '(1960). Accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656 (1961);
Tehan v. United States, ex rei. Shott, 382 U.S. 406,416 (1966);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In sum, the rule is a judicially
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional-right of the party aggrieved. 8 9
The cases cited in that passage do not support the conclusion that
the rule is no more than a judicially created remedy designed to deter
police misconduct, and not a personal constitutional right. In fact, the
very precedents the Court relies appear to compel the opposite conclusion.
True, Elkins v. United States 90 does contain the language quoted.
85.
86.
87.
88.

465 F.2d 1218, 1225-26 (6th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added).
414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
332 F. Supp. 737, 738 (N. D_ Ohio 1971).
Cited in support of this position were In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir_ 1971), affd, 408
U.S. 41 (1972); In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971), een. denied, 408 U.S.
930 (1972); United States v. Gelbard, 443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971) rev'd, 408 U.S. 41
(1972); Centracchio v, Garrity, 198 F.2d 382 (lst Cir. 1952); In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d
Cir. 1947).
89. 414 U.S. at 347-48 (emphasis'added).
90. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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But Elkins was decided a year before Mapp had overruled the portion
of Wolf v. Co lorado 9 1 that declared that the exclusionary rule was not
an "essential ingredient" of the Fourth Amendment right. 92 The Wolf
Court defined the rule as a deterrent remedy in order to justify its
refusal to make it binding on the states. When Elkins was decided, Wolf
was still good law. It no longer is today. The Elkins Court in 1960 quite
properly relied on it; for the Calandra Court in 1974 to do the same,
even indirectly, is to reflect inaccurately the present state of the law.
Furthennore, even though it followed the pre-Mapp law, Elkins, which
abrogated the "silver platter" doctrine,93 did not define deterrence as
the sole basis for exclusion. The fundamental justification for the rule,
it said, was "the imperative of judicial integrity.,,9 4
Mapp, on the page cited by Justice Powell, did acknowledge Elkins'
recognition of a deterrent purpose for the rule. The theme of the
paragraph containing that acknowledgement, however, was reaffmnation of the moral imperative stated in the earlier case: "The criminal
goes f~ee, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own
laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."9 5
Justice Powell cited Terry v. Ohio 96 as being in accord with the
proposition that deterrence is the "prime purpose" of the exclusionary
rule. 97 The only statement to which he could have referred, on the
page cited, is this: "The entire deterrent purpose of the rule excluding
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment rests on the
assumption that 'limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit
the quest itself.' ,,98
But "the entire deterrent purpose" is not at all the same as "deterrence, the entire purpose." Terry does, of course, like Elkins and Mapp,
recognize a deterrent purpose incident to the exclusionary rule, but the
conclusion that deterrence is the prime purpose of the rule cannot
stand· against even a cursory reading. While imposing limits on the
application of the rule, Terry reiterated the need to keep the judicial
system free from apparent partnership in illegal activity by law-enforcement officers: "Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and
91. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
92. [d. at 29.
93. This was a policy under which the Court permitted in federal courts evidence seized by
state officers (who were not then under any constitutional restrictions on searches and
seizures), which would have been inadmissible under Weeks if seized by federal officers.
Elkins decided that since Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), had held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibition applied to the states, the "silver platter doctrine" was no longer
constitutionally viable.
94. 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
95. 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
96. 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
97. Note 89 supra.
98. 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
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will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights
of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of
such invasions."9 9
The two other cases Justice Powell cited in support of his· assertion
that the "prime purpose" of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, Linkletter v. Walkeri 00 and Tehan v. United States, ex reI. Shott, 1 0 1 are
both cases in which the issue was retroactive application of a newly
announced constitutional standard.
Linkletter laid out three criteria for determining when newly decided
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will be applied in review of
cases tried before the rules were formulated: (1) the purpose served by
the new rules; (2) the extent of law enforcement officials' justifiable
reliance on prior standards; and (3) the effect on the administration of
justice of retroactive enforcement.
In applying these criteria the Court stressed the deterrent function of
the rule, not as a rationale for its imposition, but in a context of
determining what benefits and burdens might accrue from back-dating
its application. 1 0 2 Linkletter and Tehan were not saying, "What is the
reason for the rule?" but, "What is the purpose to be served by
applying it after the fact?" In this context deterrence and reparation
are the important factors to consider, since protection of the Fourth
Amendment guarantee cannot be instituted retroactively.
Within this framework, both Linkletter and Tehan decided that the
harm that had been done by constitutional violations antedating the
case at hand could not be undone; that the violations in question had
not been such as tended to contaminate the truth-finding function of
the defendants' trials; and that the benefit the injured individuals might
derive from retrospective purification of police procedures would be
outweighed by the detrimental effect on society of, for example,
releasing numerous defendants, properly adjudged guilty and under
long sentence, for whom retrial would be difficult.
To say that the rule's deterrent purpose would not be served by
retroactive application, after the wrong was long since complete and
trial had been had under rules that were valid at the time, is a very'
much different thing from saying that deterrence was the primary
rationale for its formulation.
99. ld. at 12.
100. 381 U.S. 618 (1965), holding that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), would not be applied
retroactively. Linkletter states: "Mapp had as its prime purpose the enforcement of the
Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule within its rights." 381
U.S. at 636.
101. 382 U.S. 406 (1966), denying retrospective application to Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965).
102. "Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, not prohibited from
applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and
whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
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The cases cited by Justice Powell, considered in their proper contexts, do not lead to the conclusion that "in sum the rule is a judicially
created remedy ... rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved. "I 03 The "sum" comprises Justice Powell's own extrapolations; it does not represent the total weight of the precedents he
cites.
Mapp, building on Weeks and Silverthorne, goes to painstaking
lengthsl 04 to make clear that. a "personal constitutional right" is
exactly what the Court, in extending it to the states, found the rule to
be. If it had not so considered it, there would have been no basis for the
Mapp decision. The Supreme Court of the United States has no authority to make a mere "judicially created remedy" binding on the state
courts. The language of Mapp makes its position clear:
Finally, the Court in [Weeks] clearly stated that use of the
seized evidence involved a "denial of the constitutional rights of
the accused." Thus, in the year 1914, in the Weeks case, this
Court "for the first time" held that "in a federal prosecution
the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured
through an illegal search and seizure. " This Court has ever since
required of federal law officers a strict adherence to that command which this Court has held to be a clear, specific, and
constitutionally required-even if judicially implied-deterrent
safeguard without insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been reduced to "a form of words." It meant,
quite simply, that "conviction by means of unlawful seizures
and enforced confessions ... should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts ... " and that such evidence "shall not
be used at all."
There are in the cases of this court some passing references to
the Weeks rule as being one of evidence. But the plain and
unequivocal language of Weeks-and its later paraphrase in
Wolf-to the effect that the Weeks rule is of constitutional
origin, remains entirely undisturbed} os
Finally, after detailed examination of the history of the exclusionary
rule from Weeks through Elkins, the Mapp Court announced its
holding:
Today we once again examine Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right to privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and, after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to
close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that
103. 414 u.s. 338, 348 (1974).
104. 367 u.s. 644, 646-55 (1961).
105. [d. at 648-49 (1961) (emphasis added; citations omitted).
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very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a state court. 1 06
Exclusion, then, as announced in Weeks and reiterated in Mapp,
exists to protect the right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment-the
right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It is "part and parcel" of the Fourth Amendment. 1 07
As Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent in Calandra, deterrence is,
at best, only a desirable by-product of the exclusionary rule. 1 08 The
aim of the Court in formulating the rule was to seek out a meaningful
sanction for invasions of Fourth Amendment guarantees. 109 The tool,
however, had to be one capable of judicial, as distinguished from
administrative, enforcement.
Bound by this limitation, the Court looked to the logic of the Fourth
Amendment itself. The mandate dictated its own sanction. The First
Amendment's command, "Congress shall make no law ... " implies,
"but if it does, the courts will strike it down." The Sixth Amendment's,
"[i] n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... "
implies, "but if he doesn't, the courts will not permit his conviction to stand." The Fifth Amendment's "[n] 0 person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... " says
clearly, "but if he is, the courts will not hear his testimony." The
Fourth Amendment treats the right of security against unreasonable
search and seizure of "persons, houses, papers and effects"-in other
words, unlawful capture of evidence. The Amendment says this right
"shall not be violated." The implication appears to be, "[b]ut if it is,
the courts will not receive the evidence."
This is what the Court in Mapp implied when it spoke of the
command of exclusion as being a "clear, specific, and constitutionally
required-even if judicially implied-deterrent safeguard.,,1 10 "Judicially implied" does not mean "judicially contrived" or "judicially
manufactured." It means derived by judges construing the language of
the ~mendment itself, the normal judicial function. And in the phrase
"deterrent safeguard," the operative word is safeguard. The exclusionary rule is a sanction, a means of preserving a precious right, which,
because of its nature and the people on whom it operates in its punitive
aspects-Prosecuting attorneys and police-has an incidental deterrent
effect.
.
If Congress were to pass a law establishing a state religion, no one
would ask how frequently this kind of thing happened. No court would
106. ld. at 654-55 (emphasis added).
107. ld. at 651.

108. 414 U;S. at 356.
109. ld.

110. Note 105 supra.

1974]

Exclusionary Rule Under Attack

109

debate whether the imposition of sanction would deter future Congresses from passing illegal legislation. The statute would fall, because
the Constitution decrees it. If a defendant were convicted after being
denied the right to call his witnesses, the question whether reversal
would deter future courts from lawlessness would not arise. The same
reasoning makes debate about the incidence of particular kinds of
police misconduct, and discussion of the deterrent value of imposing
the exclusionary rule in a given case, non sequitur.
The present Court, however, does not see the exclusionary rule as
necessary to the logic of the Bill of Rights. Having set up deterrence as
the rule's prime justification, Justice Powell then posited effective
deterrence as the sole criterion for determining whether it should be
applied in a given case: "As with any remedial device, the application of
the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives
are thought most efficaciously served. ,,1 1 1
In Calandra's case Justice Powell concluded that the goal of deterrence would not be served, on the theory that the police would not be
prompted to conduct illegal searches and seizures to gather evidence for
presentation to a grand jury, if that evidence would not be admissible at
a later criminal trial of the one from whom it has been seized. 1 ! 2
This conclusion does not reflect the reality of investigative strategy.
The effect is to leave one in Calandra's position without remedy for a
real violation of his rights, unless he can prove damages.! 1 3 Since he
has been granted immunity, his claim cannot be vindicated in the
criminal' process. 1 1 4 The decision in effect says, "Your Fourth Amendment rights are worth nothing unless the government chooses to indict
you, because in the absence of provable damages, you have no forum in
which to assert them."
What this means is that now the government has license, in investigating organized crime, as here, or the activities of political dissidents, or
"enemies," to violate with impunity the Fourth Amendment rights of
those whom it does not seek to prosecute. The incentive, in terms of
information for "background files" or investigative leads to higher
organization figures, would be, to some, irresistible.
In determining that Calandra had standing to claim suppression, the
Court of Appeals relied on Rule 41(e), Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.! 1 5 Both Jones v. United States! 1 6 and Alderman v. United
111. 414 U.S. at 348.
112. Id. at 348-49.
113. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), allows recovery of damages from federal agents conducting an illegal search and
seizure. If the illegal conduct is by state officers, acting under color of state law, an action
lies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871).
114. The immunity granted Calandra was transactional. Under the "use immunity" statute,
18 U.S.C. § § 6002-03 (1970), upheld in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972),
he would be in a worse predicament, because he could still be prosecuted on the basis of
evidence arrived at independently of his testimony.
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States' '7 had made plain that the requirement of standing to assert the
exclusionary rule is given expression in the "person aggrieved" language
of Rule 41(e). The Court of Appeals decided that Calandra was indeed
a person aggrieved, and that the rule was broad enough to permit him
to file a motion under it prior to indictment.' , 8
Reversing, Justice Powell stated that Rule 41(e) "does not constitute
a statutory expansion of the exclusionary rule,'" '9 and asserted that
permitting a suppression motion to be made before indictment would
constitute such an expansion. Justice Powell cites Brown v. United
States,' 20 Alderman,' 2' Wong Sun v. United States' :2 2 and Jones' :2 3
for the proposition that:
[S] tanding to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined
to situations where the Government seeks to use such evidence
to incriminate the victim of the unlawful search .... This standing rule is premised on a recognition that the need for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are
strongest where the Government's unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of the
search.' 24
What this assertion seemingly overlooks is that in each of the cases
cited to support it, the motion to suppress came after indictment. The
holdings were confined to those in the position of criminal defendant
because the question of standing was raised by criminal defendants.
None of the cases cited presented the question found in Calandra-that
of a person actually aggrieved, in the Jones and Alderman sense,' 2 5
115. "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court ... for
the return of the property and to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on the
ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is
insufficient on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that described in the warrant, or
(4) there was not probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the
warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge shall receive
evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is
granted the property shall be restored unless"otherwise subject to lawful detention and it
shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. ... The motion shall be made
before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefore did not exist or the defendant was not
aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the
motion at the trial or hearing."
116. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
117. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
118. United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218, 1223, (6th Cir. 1972).
119. 414 U.S. at 337-38 n.6.
120. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
121. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
122. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
123. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
124. 414 U:S. 338, 348 (1974) (citations omitted).
125. "In order"to qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure' one must
hav"e been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as
distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as
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who knows in advance of indictment that a grand jury is basing a part
of its investigation on evidence illegally seized from him, and who
moves at that stage for suppression of both the evidence and its use as
the basis for questioning.
No previous standing case holds that only a criminal defendant may
invoke the exclusionary rule. Such a holding, indeed, would be contrary
. not only to the promise of the Fourth Amendment, that the rights it
protects "shall not be violated," but also to the rule of Weeks: "[T] his
remedy reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty
of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under
our federal system with the enforcement of the laws.,,116 Justice
Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States 1 1 7 took this
language to mean that illegally seized evidence could not be laid before
the grand jury.
A general test for determining standing was stated in Association of
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp: 1 2 II
[I] t concerns, apart from the "case" or "controversy" test, the
question whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 129
If we assume that the "zone of interests" to be protected here is the
Fourth Amendment guarantee, then, since Calandra's rights were violated by the search itself, clearly Calandra had standing. Only if we
assume that the "zone of interest" is nothing more than the deterrence
of future unlawful police conduct can any question arise. Even then,
the fact that he would otherwise be without a remedy would seem
enough to tip the balance in his favor.
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is, as stated in Weeks and
Mapp, to preserve Fourth Amendment rights, then in deciding whether
to apply the rule in a particular case, logic would dictate that we look
to the purpose of the Amendment-which is not to protect the right of
the criminal defendant, as Justice Powell's position assumes, but to
protect the right of the people. "[I]t is only fair ~o observe that the
real evil aimed at by the Fourth Amendment is the search itself.... "130 Therefore, anyone whose rights are violated by an unreasonable search or seizure should have standing to invoke the exclusionary rule, whenever he becomes aware of the violation.
The Calandra decision does not directly impair the earlier standing

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else." Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914) (emphasis added).
251 U.S. 385, 391 (1920).
397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Id. at 153.
U.S. v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930).
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cases. They are inapposite to the situation presented here, and the
holdings still stand when applied to the facts that they cover. The same
is not true of Justice Powell's treatment of Silverthorne,1 3 1 the progenitor of the "fmit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. There is reason to
agree with Justice Brennan: "Only if Silverthorne is overruled can its
precedent force to compel affirmance here be denied."l 3 2
Silverthorne held that a grand jury must be denied access to illegally
seized records, books and papers.1 33 Pursuant to the Silverthornes'
motion to suppress these materials, the district court ordered return of
the originals, impounding photographs and copies of them. After returning the originals, the grand jury tried to recover them by issuing a
subpoena duces tecum. When the Silverthornes refused to comply, the
corporation was adjudged in contempt. 1 34 In reversing the conviction,
the Court, through Justice Holmes, said:
. The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that
although of course its seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may study the papers before it returns
them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has
gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form to
produce them; that the protection of the Constitution covers
the physical possession but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the
forbidden act .. '.. In our opinion such is not the law. It reduces
the Fourth Amendment to a form of words .... The essence of
a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. 1 3 5
Calandra, like the Silverthornes, sought to avoid furnishing the grand
jury with evidence that he would not have been called on to supply had
it not been for the illegal search and seizure. Justice Powell distinguished Silverthorne first on the ground that the plaintiffs-in-error had
been indicted and could therefore invoke the exclusionary rule by
virtue of their being criminal defendants.1 36 Moreover, he continued,
the government's interest in Silverthorne in recapturing the original
documents was:
... founded on a belief that they might be useful in the
criminal prosecution already authorized by the grand jury. It
131. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
132. 414 U.S. 338, 362-63 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
133. The Silverthornes, father and son, indicted on a single, specific charge. were arrested and
detained for several hours. During that time federal agents, without a warrant, went to
their office and "made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found there."
251 U.S. at 390. Mter making photographs and copies of the material. the district
attorney then presented it to the grand jury that had returned the original indictment,
and a 'new indictment was framed.
134. Although the lumber company was a corporation, it was. under the rule of Hale v. Henkel.
201 U.S. 43 (1906), in the same position as Calandra with respect to self-incrimination.
135. 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920) (citations omitted).
136. 414 U.S. 338, 352 n.8 (1974).
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did not appear that the grand jury needed the documents to
perform its investigative or accusatorial functions. Thus, the
primary consequence of the Court's decision was to exclude the
evidence from the subsequent criminal trial.) 3 7
But if the grand jury did not need the documents to perform its
investigative or accusatorial functions, why did it need them? What
other need would a grand jury have for evidence that "might be useful"
in a criminal prosecution it had already authorized? The only logical
reason for the grand jury's wanting the material was to gain information
for further criminal charges.
The final ground cited by Justice Powell for distinguishing the two
cases is that in Silverthorne there had been a judicial determination
before the issuance of the subpoena that the search and seizure was
illegal, so it was not necessary to interrupt the grand jury proceedings
pending decision of a pre-indictment motion to suppress.) 38 That
judicial determination, however, came on a motion filed during earlier
grand jury proceedings, in the course of which the documents were
ordered returned. Justice Powell raises no question about the interruption of that proceeding, which seems to weaken somewhat his basis for
distinction.
Silverthorne's pronouncement that illegally seized evidence "shall
not be used at all," Justice Powell dismissed as "broad dictum."1 3 9 It
has, he said, been substantially undermined by later decisions, chiefly
the standing cases cited earlier ,I 40 among which Calandra will now be
numbered.
MICHIGAN V. TUCKER
In Michigan v. Tucker l

the Court, speaking this time through
Justice Rehnquist, built on Harris and Calandra to further restrict
4 I

137. Id.
138. Justice Powell put great stress on the fact that interruption for adjudication of
suppression motions in advance of indictment would result in a series of "mini-trials,"
which would unduly delay the grand jury proceedings, possibly frustrating important
investigations. The district court had considered this argument too, and Judge Battisti
"respectfully rejected" it in eloquent terms:
The (erm delay means that time during which a case is allowed to lie unresolved
when there is no justifiable reason not to dispose of the lawsuit. Delay means
unavoidable delay .... Time properly consumed in the trial of a complex case, or
analyses of complex or difficult issues, or in holding a hearing to examine whether
one's constitutionally protected rights have been violated is not delay, as that term
is used in the context of the courts.... The judicial system is designed to protect
the Bill of Rights, not to cast it aside in a mad rush toward the goal of judicial
efficiency. Any examination of a potential infringement of those rights can, under
no circumstances, be considered avoidable delay. In re Calandra. 332 F. Supp. 737,
741 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
139. 414 U.S. 338, 352 n.8 (1974).
140. Id. at 348.
141. _U.S.~ 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974).
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Miranda's exclusionary rule and to seriously erode "the fruit of the
poisonous tree" as courts since Wong Sun and Miranda have understood
the doctrine.
One morning in April 1966 a woman in Pontiac, Michigan, failed to
report to her job. A friend and co-worker, alarmed when she did not
answer her telephone, went to her house and found her, bound and
gagged and partly undressed. She had been raped and severely beaten.
Throughout the course of the trial and the appeals she was unable to
recall what had happened to her.
When her friend arrived, he found a dog inside the victim's house,
although she did not own one. Later, while talking to police, he saw
what he thought was the saltle dog. Police followed it to Tucker's
house, where it sat down in the front yard; neighbors reported that the
dog was Tucker's. Tucker was arrested and taken to the sheriff's office,
where officers noticed scratches on his face and blood on his underwear. Tucker explained that the scratches had been caused by the
flailing of a goose he and his friend Henderson had shot,) 42 but the
blood on his underwear proved to be human.
Before interrogation began, Tucker, like Harris, was given warnings
that were sufficient under Escobedo v. Illinois,) 4 3 but was not, however, told that an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford to
hire one. 144
In the course of questioning, Tucker said that he had been with
Henderson during the general time when the crime occurred. Interviewed by the police, Henderson gave information incriminating
Tucker.1 4 5 Tucker's appointed attorney moved in advance of trial for
suppression of Henderson's expected testimony on the ground that it
was the fruit of the illegal interrogation. The prosecution stipulated
that the witness' identity had been learned only through the police
questioning. Although the trial court excluded Tucker's own statement,
it allowed the prosecution to introduce Henderson's testimony. Tucker
was convicted and sentenced to twenty to forty years' imprisonment.
Following affirmation by the Court of Appeals) 46 and the Supreme
Court of Michigan,14 7 he petitioned for habeas corpus in the federal
142. Tucker v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
143. 378 U.S. 478 (1963).
144. Tucker did not ask for a lawyer, and did not assert denial of the right to counsel, thus
Escobedo did not govern here. The Miranda decision was not announced for another two
months, but since trial was held after that time, as in Harris, Miranda applied under the
rule of Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
145. Henderson said that although he had seen Tucker on the date in question, Tucker had left
him rather early in the evening. The scratches on Tucker's face had been there when
Tucker arrived at Henderson's house on the following day. Henderson had asked Tucker
"if he got hold of a wild one or something." Tucker replied, "Something like that," and
when 'asked who she was, answered, "Some woman lived the next block over-a widow
woman." _U.S.-. 94 S. Ct. at 2360.
146. PeOple v. Tucker, 19 \1ich.App. 320,172 N.W.2d 712 (1969).
147. 385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W.2d 290 (1971).
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district court. "Reluctantly," the district court granted the writ. I 4 8
Relying on Silverthorne, Wong Sun and Gilbert, the court said: "[I]t is
clear that testimony of third parties which is obtained as the result of a
violation of Sixth Amendment rights of the accused cannot be introduced against the accused at trial.,,1 4 9 The Court of Appeals approved
without opinion.) 50
Narrow grounds for reversal were argued by the State of Michigan I 5) and accepted by two concurring Justices, Brennan and Marshall.
They urged that Johnson v. New Jersey I 52 be modified by adoption of
an "activity date," as opposed to Johnson's "trial date," rule concerning the retroactive effect of Miranda. That is, the date of interrogation,
rather than the date of the trial, should be the one used to determine
whether Miranda applied in a given case. I 53 Justice Bre~nan reasoned
that the adoption of such a policy was particularly appropriate when
. admissibility of fruits of interrqgation was at issue, as opposed to
admissibility of a direct statement, because the element of unreliability
)s less important in such a case. I 54
The case could also have been decided on the narrow basis that the
"poisonous tree" doctrine should not apply to the testimony of a live
witness, provided the witness himself is available for cross-examination.
This ground, also urged by the state, I 5 5 would have been consistent
with two cases decided by Chief Justice Burger when he was a Court of
Appeals judge. I 56 Such a result could have been justified in a case like
148. Tucker v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
149. Id. at 269. In Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court said that the trial
testimony that the witnesses had identified the defendant at the pre· trial lineup had to be
excluded since the lineup itself was illegal: "Thai testimony was the direct result of the
illegal line-up, 'come at by exploitation of [the primary) illegality.' [Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) )."
150. 480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1973).
151. Brief for Petitioner at 8-10, Michigan v. Tucker, _ U.S. ~ 94 S. Ct. 2357 (1974). The
State also argued that Miranda should be overruled and the "all attendant circumstances" test of voluntariness reinstated.
152. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
153. Such an approach would be consistent with Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);which
held that the rule of Wade and Gilbert would apply only to confrontations that took place
after the date of decision; with Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), which held
that the standards set forth in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), would apply
only to wiretaps made after the decision date; and with Williams v. United States, 401
U.S. 646 (1971), which held that the Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), standards
would apply only to searches conducted after the decision date. In addition, Jenkins v.
Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969), had held that the Miranda rules would not apply to
retrials of persons whose original trial had begun prior to Miranda, which is not
inconsistent with an "activity" rationale.
154. _ U.S. _, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2371 (1974) (concurring opinion).
155. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7, Michigan v. Tucker, _U.S.~ 94·S. Ct. 2357 (1974).
156. In Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963), police learned the name of an
eyewitness through illegal interrogation of the defendant. Then Judge Burger wrote:
Here no confessions or utterances of the appellants were used against them;
tangible evidence obtained from appellants, such as the victim's watch, was
suppressed along with the confessions. But a witness is not an inanimate object
which like contraband narcotics, a pistol or stolen goods, "speak for themselves."
The proffer of a living witness is not to be mechanically equated with the proffer of
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Tucker's, where the name of the witness was furnished as an alibi. The
police were bound to interview Henderson, to learn whether he would
in fact exculpate the defendant. An argument could be made that since
the state had an obligation to seek his testimony, it should not be
barred from using it.
The majority, however, rejected these bases for decision, which
would have left Miranda intact. Instead, the Court reached out to work
substantial changes in the Miranda doctrine. Tucker declares:
(1) Police interrogation of a suspect without giving him the full
Miranda warnings does not deprive him of his privilege against selfincrimination as such, but only fails "to make available to him the full
measure of procedural safeguards associated with that right since
Miranda. ".

5 7

(2) Therefore, since -there has been no "actual infringement" of the
defendant's constitutional rights, Wong Sun does not apply. This leaves
the Court, in the absence of controlling precedent, free to "examine the
matter as a question of principle.'" 5 8 Miranda, said the Court, does
not reach the question of fruits.' 5 9
(3) As a matter of principle, since no deterrent purpose would be
served by excluding the testimony of a live witness whose identity was
learned through an interrogation conducted in good-faith omission of a
procedural safeguard, that witness' testimony will be admitted. The
opinion does not state whether its rule would apply if the defendant's
statement had led them to physical evidence of equal reliability. The
logic of the decision does not seem to bar such a conclusion.
Tucker explicitly extends the deterrence rationale for exclusion to a
self-incrimination setting} 60 It then reiterates Calandra's assumption
that the rule is properly applied only when its deterrent purpose would
be served:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged' in willful, or at the very
least, negligent conduct which has deprived the defendant of
some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of
inanimate evidentiary objects illegally seized. The fact that the name of a
potential witness is disclosed to police is of no evidentiary significance, per se,since
the living witness is an individual human personality whose attributes of will,
perception, memory and volition interact to determine what testimony he will
give. [d. at 88l.

157.
158.
159.
160.

Similarly, concurring in Brown v. United States, 375 F.2d 310 (D.C.Cir. 1967), he wrote:
The critical aspect of Smith-Bowden is that live witnesses are not "suppressed," as inanimate objects may be. When an eyewitness is willing to give
testimony, under oath and subject to all the rigors of cross-examination and penalties of perjury, he must be heard. How he came to be in court is a matter which
goes only to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony. [d. at 319.
_ U.S. ~ 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2364 (1974).
[d.
[d. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2368 n.26.
Harris extended it implicitly.
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such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular
investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater
degree of care towards the right of an accused. Where the
official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the
deterrence rationale loses much of its force. 16 1
Justice Rehnquist considers it sufficient that, in accordance with
Miranda and Johnson, the defendant's own statements were excluded at

trial. Evidence derived from those statements is not barred, because to
do so would not further the goal of deterrence. 1 62
If any person is compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against
himself-as Miranda held he is when interrogation is conducted absent
the prescribed warnings and required waiver--exclusion of his testimony
is not optional. The Fifth Amendment is an exclusionary rule. 16 3
Though many different reasons have been advanced to explain the
historical basis of the privilege,. 64 and it has been subject periodically
to attack,. 6 5 it is beyond question that unless a defendant is insulated
from any criminal penalties, the government may not use his compelled
testimony to prove its case against him .16 6 Exclusion in a Fifth
Amendment context is not to deter future misconduct, but to carry out
the express tenns of the Amendment.
Tucker had argued that the testimony should be excluded on the
ground that the adversary system requires "the government in its
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load."1 6 7 This
161. _ U.S. ~ 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2365 (1974). Justice Rehnquist cited Calandra for the
proposition that the exclusionary rule's "prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police
conduct," Id. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2365, and stated that Calandra "relied upon" (in addition
to Elkins) Mapp, Tehan and Terry. Id. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2365, n.20. He then continued,
"In a proper case this rationale would seem applicable to the Fifth Amendment context as
well." _ U.S. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2365 (emphasis added).
162. "Whatever deterrent effect on future police conduct the exclusion of those statements
may have had, we do not believe it would be significantly augmented by excluding the
testimony of the witness Henderson as well." _ U.S. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2366 (1974).
163. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring), "But I think
that words taken from his lips ... are ... inadmissible provided they are taken from him
without his consent. They are inadmissible because of the command of the Fifth
Amendment.
"'That is an unequivocal, defmite and workable rule of evidence for state and federal
courts." Id. at 179.
164. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 55-57 n.5 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. ·616 (1886); United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 566, 579,
581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting), reu'd 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
165. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Friendly, J., The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow:
The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968). See also Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
166. See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 652 (1892), the privilege must be "as
broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard."
See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591
(1896).
167. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev. 1961) quoted by the court, _ U.S. at
~ 94 S. Ct. at 2366.
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interpretation of the basis of the privilege Justice Rehnquist defined as
a "suggested basis for the exclusionary rule in Fifth Amendment
cases. 1 6 8 He discredits Wigmore's rationale by saying that to the extent
that it "may exist independently of the deterrence and trustworthiness
rationales,"1 6 9 it is of no help to Tucker, since "the government is not
forbidden all resort to the defendant to make out its case.,,170 To
support this statement Justice Rehnquist cited Schmerber v. California l 7 1 and United States v. Dionisio. 1 72 Neither of these cases has
any bearing, however, on Tucker's situation, since both dealt expressly
with the compelled production of non testimonial evidence, which the
Court held was not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The Fifth Amendment requires exclusion of evidence produced in
violation of the privilege it confers. Miranda held that the privilege is
violated by custodial interrogation that does not comply fully with its
requirement of warnings and waiver. The interrogation in Tucker did
not meet the Miranda requirement. Hence it would seem that under the
principles of Silverthorne and Wong Sun, evidence derived from that
interrogation must be excluded, unless Miranda does not apply; 73 or
an exception is made to it; 74 or Miranda is overruled. Justice
Rehnquist rejected all three of these options. Instead, he distorted the
controlling precedent to conclude that interrogation without the full
Miranda warnings did not violate Tucker's Fifth Amendment rights:
The Court [in Miranda] recognized that these procedural
safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination was protected. As the Court remarked: '[W] e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily
requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent
compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted.' The suggested safeguards were not intended to "create
a constitutional straightjacket," but rather to provide practical
reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination.1 75
The actual passage cited in Miranda does not carry the meaning
Justice Rehnquist found in it. What Miranda said was that the warnings
and waiver that it demanded to pro~ct the Fifth Amendment privilege
were not the only possible safeguards that could be devised to suit the
purpose. The states were encouraged to work out alternative solutions
168. _ U.S. at---. 94 S. Ct. at 2366 (emphasis added).
169. [d. at ---. 94 S. Ct. at 2366-67.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

[d. at ---. 94 S. Ct. at 2367.
384 U.S. 757 (1966).
410 U.S. 1 (1973).
For example, it would not apply under the suggested "activity date" rationale.
An example is, by excepting the testimony of an alibi witness.
~ U.S. ---. 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2364 (1974) (citations omitted).
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to arrive at the same result, but until they did, the procedure laid out in

Miranda was constitutionally mandatory. 1 76 The State of Michigan had

made no showing of any effort to develop alternative procedures to
cover the full scope of the Miranda requirement. Its officers had simply
omitted an element of the" necessary warnings.
The conclusion that the omission of the required warnings was not a
violation of a constitutional right, but only a deprivation of a procedural safeguard conflicts with express language in Miranda: "The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with
respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary
ritual to existing methods of interrogation[,]"1 77 :md: "In each instance [of the four cases decided iIi Miranda], we have concluded that
statements were obtained from the defendant under circumstances that
did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege.,,1 78 If the Miranda Court had not considered the warning and
waiver requirement of constitutional dimension, of course, it would
have been constitutionally prohibited from applying it to the states.
This facet of federalism the Court ignored in Tucker as it did in
Calandra.
In further support of the contention that the defendant was not

deprived of any constitutional right, Justice Rehnquist asserted that
since Tucker said he did not want a lawyer, his statement "could hardly
be termed involuntary as that term has been defined in the decisions of
this COurt.;'1 79 He was "simply not exposed to 'the cruel trilemma of
self-accUsation, perjury, or contempt.' "1 80
One purpose of Miranda, however, was to end the confusion and
uncertainty fostered by the long-standing policy of case-by-case ad176.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

It is impossible for us to see the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege
which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative
rule· making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily
requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the
interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a
constitutional straitjacket which will handicap efforts at reform, nor is it intended
to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the
individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However,
unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising
accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity
to exercise it, the following procedures must be observed. 384 U.S. 436, 467
(1966). (emphasis added).
ld. at 476.
ld. at 491 (emphasis added).
_ U.S. at __ 94 S. Ct. at 2364.
ld. at __ 94 S. Ct. at 2364, quoting Murphyv. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
For thirty years after Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), holding inadmissible a
confession obtained by state officers who beat a suspect with ropes and studded belts, the
Court attempted, by" considering the "totality of the circumstances," to determine
whether a particular confession was voluntary or coerced. Frankfurter, J., discusses the
"ultimate test" of voluntariness in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 570-602
(1961). See also Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935,973-82
(1966).
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judication of voluntariness.' 8' Instead, per se exclusion was to follow
omission of the necessary warnings and failure to get a knowing,
intelligent waiver of the right they were instituted to protect. The
"voluntariness" test was expressly rejected.' 8 2 Tucker appears to reinstate it.
Apparently, under Tucker, if a defendant's statement can be considered voluntary by the "cruel trilemma" test, his constitutional rights
are not violated by incomplete Miranda warnings. Then, provided the
omission was inadvertent and neither willful nor negligent, only his
statements themselves are barred. Evidence derived from them is admissible. This may be true whether such evidence is physical or testimonial.
The court said in Miranda that statements taken in violation of
the Miranda principles must not be used to prove the prosecution's case at trial. That requirement was fully complied with by
the state court here: respondent's statements, claiming that he
was with Henderson and then asleep during the time period of
the crime were not admitted against him at trial.' 83
Building on this Court's own fragile precedent, Justice Rehnquist
cites Harris as authority that a failure to give an interrogated suspect
.full Miranda warnings does not compel exclusion of his statements in
every conceivable situation.' 84 Harris' conclusion that it does not
follow from Miranda that all evidence inadmissible in the case in chief is
barred for all purposes, provided its trustworthiness satisfies legal standards, says Justice Rehnquist, "is equally applicable here;'" 85
Tucker's assertion that Miranda requires exclusion only of the defendant's statements, and not of their fruits, conflicts with the language
of that case-language that under the Harris standard must be considered "controlling," since it appeared in the Court's summary of its
holding:
After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights arid agree to answer questions or make a
statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained
as a result of interrogation can be used against him.' 8 6
Two of the dissenters in Miranda took "no evidence" to apply to
182. "In these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in
traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth
Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest .... To be sure, the records do
not evince overt physical coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact remains that in
none of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the
outset of the interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free
.
choice." 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
183. _ U.S. ~ 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2364 (1974).
184. Id. "at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2367. The situation here, however, is not similar to that in Harris.
185. Id. at ~ 94 S. Ct. at 2367~.
186. 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (emphasis added).
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fruits as well as to direct statements. 1 87 Justice Brennan, also a
member of the Miranda Court, stated that his concurrence in the result
in Tucker (on the basis of an "activity date" modification of Johnson)
rests on the assumption that Miranda requires the exclusion of fruits in
order to give full effect to the "no evidence" language of the holding. 1 8 8 Justice Rehnquist disposed of this argument by flat contradiction. Modification of Johnson, he stated, would not solve the problems
of this case. Johnson is not controlling on fruits, for the reason that the
parent decision, Miranda, did not reach the question of fruits. 1 89
Miranda held that police failure to comply with its requirements
violated the Fifth Amendment privilege. That being so, the Court could
hardly have felt it necessary to spell out that it meant the decision to
apply to fruits of a coerced confession as well as to the confession
itself. A long line of cases, beginning with Counselman in 1892, had
held that a violation of the self-incrimination clause barred not only
direct but derivative use of the defendant's testimony. 1 90
Kastigar v. United States, 1 91 a decision of the present Court, recognized "that derivative use is prohibited even when the fruit is the
testimony of a live witness. Stating that :'use-derivative use" immunity
is consistent with the conceptual basis of Counselman, the Court cited
that case's condemnation of an immunity statute without a "derivative
use" provision on the ground:
that it could not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses
and evidence which should be attributable directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on which he might
be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had refused to answer,
he could not possibly have been convicted. 1 9 2

Miranda offered strong incentive to police and prosecutors to conwly
with its terms. If the state could establish that the required warnings
187. Justice Clark wrote, "The court further holds that failure to follow the new procedures
requires inexorably the exclusion of any statement by the accused, as well as the fruits
thereof." 384 U.S. at 500 (emphliSis added). And Justice White said: "Today's decision
leaves open such questions as whether the accused was in custody, whether his
statements were spontaneous or the product of interrogation, whether the accused has
effectively waived his rights, and whether nontestimonial evidence introduced at trial is
the fruit of statements made during a prohibited interrogation, all of which are certain to
prove productive of uncertainty during investigation and litigation during prosecution."
384 U.S. at 545 (emphasis added). In concurring in the Tucker decision, however, Justice
White said Mironda did not deal with the testimony of third persons. _ U.S. at ---. 94 S.
Ct. at 2372.
188. _U.S. ---. 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2372 n.5. For interpretations that "evidence obtained as a
result" does not include derivative evidence, see H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 279 (1967); 35
FORDHAM L. REV. 169, 193 (1966).
189. _ U.S. at ---.94 S. Ct. at 2364 n.26.
190. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). "The privilege afforded not
only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise
embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute .... " Henderson's testimony falls clearly within this definition.
191. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
192. [d. at 454, citing 142 U.S. 547, 564 (1892) (emphasis added).
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had been given, and the necessary waiver obtained, it virtually assured
the admissibility of any statement the defendant made, so long as the
police conduct had not been so grossly coercive as to violate due
process. 1 9 3 The combined holdings of Tucker and Harris seem to
remove any incentive to more than ritualistic adherence to Miranda.
If an element of the warnings is omitted, or the warnings are given
and a voluntary waiver not obtained, the defendant's statement itself,
under Harris, may be used to impeach any testimony he offers at trial.
Now, in addition, if the state can meet the elusive requirement of
showing that any deficiency under Miranda was inadvertent and not
willful, l 94 evidence derived from that statement is admissible in the
prosecution's case in chief. If, as Justice Rehnquist concludes, Miranda
does not reach the question of fruits, there would seem to be no logical
necessity to limit Tucker's holding to live testimony. If that is so-if the
state may make full use of the defendent's statement to gather leads to
whatever corroborative evidence it needs-then loss of the statement
itself as direct evidence would, in most cases, be no loss at all. The
"fruit of the poisonous tree" would seem to have lost most of its
vitality in self-incrimination cases. Moreover, obedience to Miranda
appears to be reduced almost to a discretionary matter of investigative
strategy.
Justice Rehnquist justified the Tucker holding as a balance of interests. On the one side he placed society's interest in "making available
to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence,"
and its interest in the "effective prosecution of criminals." On the
other, he placed the "need to provide an effective sanction to a
constitutional right."l 9 5

THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE
Abandonment of the exclusionary rule has much reasoned support. 1 96 The means the present Court has chosen to achieve it, however, leave much to be desired. The process of attrition of the rule,
rather than overruling it, breeds uncertainty as to what the law is. In
pursuing its policy of gradual withdrawal, the Court has made hairline
distinctions and novel interpretations of earlier cases. It has then built
193.
194.
195.
196.

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Actually, Tucker does not state where the burden of proof of willfulness or negligence lies.
_ U.S. at - > 94 S. Ct. at 2366.
E.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1934); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150
N.E. 585 (1926); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 214& (McNaughton rev. 1961); Little, The
Exclusionary Rule of Evidence as a Means of Enforcing the Fourth Amendment Morality
on Police, 3 IND. L.F. 375 (19~0); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970); Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of
Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785 (1970); Bums, Mapp v. Ohio: An
All American Mistake, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 80 (1969); Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden,
54 MICH. L. REV. 679 (1944).
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on its own short string of precedents to create the impression that the
law has always been what the Court now says it is.
Moreover, the decisions of this Court tend to overlook or dismiss the
distinct imperatives enunciated in the earlier cases. I 9 7 This Court
apparently thinks in terms of practical goals, weighing principle according to whether it furthers them. In both Tucker and Calandra, for
instance, the Court makes clear that in its view the application of the
exclusionary rule depends wholly on whether its invocation in a particular type of proceeding will significantly further the goal of deterrence of unlawful police conduct. It treats deterrence as the sole
rationale for the rule, ignoring the other bases explicitly stated in prior
cases: the constitutional mandate;' 98 the imperative of judicial integrity;1 99 and the facilitation of the fair administration of justice.20 0
Apparently this Court does not agree that it "is a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an
ignoble part."2 0 I
A focus on results, particularly when they promote efficient law
enforcement, finds support among some reputable scholars and practitioners, who disparage decisions dealing in philosophical abstractions. 2 02 But even purely pragmatic decisions should depend on careful
reasoning and honest attention to precedent. They should not be based
on bald pronouncements that ignore or misread the clear constitutional
command of earlier cases. The practice of this Court, however, has been
to distort the meaning of the principal exclusion cases, making them
appear to say what they do not say-or not to say what they do say. 2 0 3
197. For instance, in his dissent in Bivens, Chief Justice Burger wrote: "From time to time
members of the Court ... have articulated varying alternative justifications for the
suppression of important evidence in a criminal trial. Under one of these alternative
theories the rule's foundation is shifted to the 'sporting contest' thesis that the
government must 'play the game fairly' and cannot be allowed to profit from its own
illegal acts. But the exclusionary rule does not ineluctably flow from a desire to ensure
that government plays the 'game' according to the rules." 403 U.S. 388, 414 (diasenting
opinion) (citations omitted). See also Justice Brennan's dissent in Calandro: "For the
first time, the Court today discounts to the point of extinction the vital function of the
rule to insure that the judiciary avoids even the slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal
government conduct. This rejection of 'the imperative of judicial integrity' ... openly
invites' [t)he conviction that all government is staffed by ... hypocrites. [This conviction
is) easy to instill and difficult to erase.' .. 414 U.S. at 360.
198. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
199. Elkins v. United States,364 U.S. 206 (1960).
200. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
201. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
202. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) (White, J., dissenting); Inbau,
Playing God: 5 to 4, 57 J. CRIM. L. 377 (1966); H. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929 (1965).
203. The practice is not without precedent:
"'When luse a word,'.Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what
I choose it to mean -neither more nor less.'
"'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different
things.'
.. 'The question is.' said Humpty Dumpty. 'which is to be the master-that's all ... •
L. CARROLL. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 299-300 (Gosset and Dunlop ed.).
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Many have felt that the Warren Court went too far in protecting the
rights of criminal defendants. Re-evaluation of its decisions by a newly
constituted Court, with a different philosophical bent, is expected and
appropriate. The traditions of our jurisprudence, however, lead us to
expect that constitutional issues will not be reached when the case can
be decided on narrower grounds, and that decisions will be no broader
than they need be to reach the issues of a particular case. It was on this
point that the Warren Court drew some of its harshest rebukes from
"strict constructionists. "
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is.,,204 This power, under our Constitution,
reposes nowhere else. If our highest Court, in haste to reformulate the
law, misrepresents what the law has been, then it arrogates to itself the
function of law-making so that justice is no longer defined by law, but
by the men of the Court.
Barbara Mello
204. Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. 137 (1803), cited in United States v. Nixon, _ U.S. ~ 94 S
Ct. 3090 (1974).

